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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new information on the effects of deregulation and consolidation in financial services
markets by analyzing the Spanish insurance industry. The sample period 1989-1998 spans the introduction
of the European Union’s Third Generation Insurance Directives, which deregulated the EU insurance
market.  Deregulation has led to dramatic changes in the Spanish insurance market; the number of firms
declined by 35 percent and average firm size increased by 275 percent.  We analyze the causes and effects
of consolidation using modern frontier efficiency analysis to estimate cost, technical, and allocative
efficiency, as well as using Malmquist analysis to measure total factor productivity change.  The results show
that many small, inefficient, and financially under-performing firms were eliminated from the market due
to insolvency or liquidation and that acquirers in the mergers and acquisitions market prefer relatively
efficient target firms. As a result, the market experienced significant growth in total factor productivity over
the sample period.  Consolidation reduced the number of firms operating with increasing returns to scale but
also increased the number operating with decreasing returns to scale. Hence, many large firms should focus
on improving efficiency rather than on further growth. 1For further discussion of deregulation of the U.S. banking industry, see Berger, et al. (1995) and Barth,
et al. (2000). Deregulation of European banking is discussed in Barth, et al. (1997); and deregulation in the
Japanese financial system is discussed in Dekle (1998) and Goto (1999).  Deregulation in the European insurance
industry is discussed in Hogan (1995), Swiss Re (1996), and Hess and Trauth (1998); and deregulation in the
Japanese insurance industry is discussed in Swiss Re (2000a).
Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency:
Evidence From the Spanish Insurance Industry
1.  Introduction
Financial services markets have changed significantly over the past two decades, following the
deregulation of banking, insurance, and other financial services in major industrialized nations. The
implementation of the European Union’s (EU’s) Second Banking Directive (1993) and Third Generation
Insurance Directive (1994) aimed at deregulating the EU banking and insurance markets, respectively. Japan
initiated financial system deregulation with the “Big Bang” financial reforms, launched in 1996; and U.S.
regulations were relaxed in stages, culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Common themes of
these deregulatory efforts include the removal of restrictions on ownership of different types of financial
services firms, the relaxation of geographical restrictions on branching and sales, and price deregulation.
1 
A principal objective of financial services deregulation is to improve market efficiency and enhance
consumer choice through increased competition. Efficiency gains can occur as the result of the market
consolidation that has accompanied deregulation, particularly in Europe and the U.S.  Consolidation has the
potential to improve X-efficiency in an industry if it results in poorly performing firms exiting the market,
either through voluntary or involuntary withdrawal or through mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  If acquiring
firms have superior management and/or better technology, they may be able to improve the performance of
merger targets.  Consolidation also can positively affect efficiency if it permits firms to take advantage of scale
economies to reduce unit costs of production.  Consolidation has the potential to reduce income volatility by
increasing firm size and diversification.  M&As among firms offering different product lines also may permit
firms to realize economies of scope.  In spite of the significant potential for efficiency gains from
consolidation, the research evidence on the efficiency effects of consolidation has been mixed, with some2
2The First and Second Generation Insurance Directives, which were more limited in scope than the Third
Generation Directives, are discussed briefly in the next section of the paper.
studies showing efficiency gains and others showing no efficiency gains or efficiency losses (Berger and
Humphrey 1997).  Of particular relevance for the present study, researchers have found little or no cost
efficiency gains and only modest revenue efficiency gains on average for intra-country consolidation of firms
within a particular product category, (Berger, et al. 1999, Berger 2000).
The objective of the present paper is to provide additional information on the effects of deregulation
and consolidation on financial services market efficiency by analyzing the Spanish insurance industry. The
Spanish industry has been affected by the overall deregulation of European insurance markets, particularly
through the EU’s Third Generation Insurance Directives, implemented in July 1994.  The Third Directives
effectively deregulated the EU insurance market, with the exception of solvency regulation, which is carried
out by the insurer’s home country. The market changes have been particularly significant in Spain because the
government began encouraging mergers and acquisitions in the insurance industry even prior to the adoption
of the Third Generation Directives, under a 1984 law and a 1985 Royal Decree.  The 1980s Spanish
deregulation was designed to create insurers that would be more efficient and competitive both nationally and
internationally.  As a result of these regulatory policy changes, the number of Spanish insurers declined by 35
percent between 1989 and 1998 and average firm size increased by 275 percent.
Government policies encouraging consolidation make sense economically if larger firms tend to be
more X-efficient, if there are unrealized scale economies, and/or if consolidation leads to more vigorous
competition that increases market efficiency.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze scale economies and
efficiency in the Spanish insurance industry to determine whether deregulation has had the intended effects.
We analyze the Spanish insurance industry over the ten-year period 1989-1998, which spans the
implementation of both the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives and is subsequent to the
adoption of the Spanish government’s consolidation policy.
2 To measure efficiency, we estimate “best
practice” production and cost frontiers for each year of the sample period, using data envelopment analysis3
(DEA), a non-parametric technique (see Charnes, et al. 1994).  A production frontier gives the minimum inputs
required to produce any given output vector, while the cost frontier measures the minimum costs to produce
the output vector.  Efficiency, which is measured for each firm in the sample in each year, ranges from 0 to
1, with firms operating on the frontier measured as fully efficient (efficiency of 1), and firms not operating on
the frontier measured as inefficient (efficiency between 0 and 1). 
Because the Spanish government’s policies and the EU directives both have had the effect of
facilitating the creation of  larger and presumably more competitive insurers, we pay particular attention to
the issue of economies of scale. Scale economies might be present in the insurance industry not only because
fixed costs are spread over a wider base as firm size increases but also because insurance involves the
diversification of risk, which is more effective in larger risk pools. On the other hand, if insurance is primarily
a variable cost industry and insurers can use reinsurance to reduce income volatility, significant scale
economies may not be present.  Policies encouraging growth in firm size make sense on scale efficiency
grounds only if there are or were many insurers operating with increasing returns to scale. 
To provide additional information on the effects of consolidation, we analyze the characteristics of
firms exiting the market due to mergers and acquisitions (M&As), firms exiting for other reasons such as
voluntary or involuntary liquidation, and firms participating in M&As as acquirers of other firms. If
consolidation has been beneficial, we expect firms exiting the market due to liquidation to be relatively
inefficient in comparison with other firms in the market.  Consolidation is also likely to improve efficiency
if M&A target firms have some desirable characteristics that may benefit the acquiring firm as well as some
undesirable areas where their performance can be improved by the acquirers.  In addition, for consolidation
to be beneficial, acquiring firms are expected to be  minimally no less efficient than firms not involved in
M&As.  In addition to presenting descriptive statistics on firms by M&A status, we estimate probit models
to identify in a multi-variate context the firm characteristics associated with the probability of being an
acquisition target, exiting the market due to liquidation, or being an acquirer in the M&A market.  
If deregulation has had the intended effects, productivity should improve over the sample period.4
3We focus the present study on technical and cost efficiency in order to provide a thorough analysis of
these topics, including the effects of mergers and acquisitions, as well as conducting the Malmquist productivity
analysis.  Extending this paper to consider other important issues such as the effect of consolidation on revenue
efficiency, profit efficiency, and market power would have significantly lengthened the paper.  We elected to
present our results on those topics in subsequent papers. 
Accordingly, we also measure total factor productivity growth, where productivity growth is defined as the
change in output due to technical efficiency change (the distance of firms from the production frontier) and
technical change (movements in the frontier over time).  We analyze productivity growth using the Malmquist
index approach (see Grosskopf 1993, Färe, et al. 1994), an extension of the DEA methodology.
3
There is a growing body of literature on efficiency in the insurance industry (for a review see Cummins
and Weiss 2001).  The role of consolidation, organizational form, and distribution systems in the U.S.
insurance industry has been analyzed by Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1998), Cummins, Weiss, and Zi
(1999), and Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997), among others.  The insurance industries in France, Japan,
Italy, Austria, and Germany have been studied by Fecher, et al. (1993), Fukuyama (1997), Cummins, Turchetti,
and Weiss (1997), and Mahlberg and Url (1998, 2000), respectively.  There has been one prior paper on the
Spanish insurance industry, by Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé, and Perelman (2001).  We extend their research by
conducting a more extensive analysis of insurance industry efficiency, using a different methodology to
analyze total factor productivity growth, and studying Spanish insurers that specialize in life or non-life
insurance as well as diversified firms writing both types of insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The hypotheses are discussed in section 2.  Section
3 describes the database, defines insurance industry inputs and outputs, and provides a brief discussion of the
concept of frontier efficiency concepts as well as the DEA and Malmquist methodologies.  The results are
presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2.  Hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss the hypotheses to be tested in this study.  We begin with an analysis of the
expected effects of recent regulatory policy changes on insurance market structure and competition.5
4Such a result would be consistent with the predictions of Stigler’s (1971) capture theory of regulation,
which holds that regulation will serve the interests of the regulated industry, and also would be consistent with
Peltzman’s (1976) interest group pressure theory of regulation under conditions where the insurers are the
dominant interest group. 
5Deregulation began with the First Generation Directives, which were adopted for reinsurance in 1964,
for non-life insurance in 1973, and for life insurance in 1979. The First Generation Directives introduced
“freedom of establishment” with host country control, giving insurers the right to establish subsidiaries, branch
offices, and agencies in each EU member state. However, retention of host country supervision meant that firms
were required to be licensed and supervised in each country where they conducted business.  Moreover, host
countries retained the right to stringently regulate all aspects of market conduct, including prices. The Second
Generation Directives, adopted for large commercial risks in 1988 and for auto insurance and some types of life
insurance in 1990, established “freedom of services,” giving insurers the ability to conduct business outside of
their home country without having to establish branches in host countries.  However, except for large commercial
risks, host country supervision was retained in most EU member nations until the adoption of the Third
Generation Directives (Swiss Re 1996, Hess and Trauth 1998) . 
The Third Generation Directives
The insurance industry in Europe traditionally has been subject to stringent regulation affecting
pricing, contractual provisions, the establishment of branches, solvency standards, and numerous additional
operational details. A separate market existed in every European country, and cross-border transactions were
rare, except for reinsurance and some commercial coverages. Competitive intensity was very low, with
minimal price and product competition and stable profit margins (Swiss Re 1996, 2000b).
4
The implementation of the EU’s Third Generation Directives, beginning on July 1, 1994, represented
a major step in creating conditions in the EU resembling those in a single deregulated national market.
5  The
Third Generation Directives have three key components: (1) The establishment of a single EU license,
whereby an insurer is required to obtain only one license to operate in the EU rather than being licensed in
each member nation.  (2) The principle of home country supervision, whereby an insurer is regulated only by
the nation which issued its license and not by each host country where it operates.  And (3) the abolition of
“substantive insurance supervision,” meaning that regulation is limited to solvency control and that pricing,
contracting, and other aspects of insurer operations are effectively deregulated. Thus, insurers are allowed to
engage in true price competition in personal lines markets for the first time and also to compete more freely
in terms of products and services.6
6One reason that cross-border competition has been slow to emerge is that the Directives did not
completely eliminate the ability of host countries to influence insurance markets.  For example, EU member
countries can still utilize taxation to discriminate between domestic companies and those based in other EU
countries (Hess and Trauth 1998).  In addition, there are significant differences in contract law across European
nations (Swiss Re 1996), impeding contract standardization.  Domestic insurers also are likely to have an
advantage in their home markets because of cultural affinities, established brand names, and buyer perceptions
that such firms have higher quality or financial stability than foreign firms.  Finally, foreign insurers may be at
a disadvantage in comparison with domestic insurers in terms of their knowledge of the underwriting
characteristics of buyers, exposing foreign firms to higher informational asymmetry problems and adverse
selection relative to domestic firms.  
Hypothesized Effects of Regulatory Policy Changes
Efficiency.  The Third Generation Directives were expected to bring about price and product
competition across national boundaries.  Given the degree of protectionism that existed in the past, such
market liberalization has the potential to increase consumer choice and produce downward pressure on prices.
In addition, the level of efficiency in the industry is expected to improve as the result of market share gains
by efficient firms, which were previously constrained from exploiting their efficiency advantage due to
regulation. Inefficient firms are expected either to become more efficient or to exit the market.  Accordingly,
the level of efficiency in the Spanish insurance industry is predicted to increase over our sample period, with
especially significant improvements after the adoption of the Third Generation Directives in 1994.  
Although it seems reasonable to predict that the Third Generation Directives will have beneficial
effects on competition, to date this has primarily occurred through more aggressive competition among
insurers in their home markets rather than through cross-border competition.
6  Evidence supporting this view
with respect to Germany is presented in Mahlberg and Url (2000), who report intensified price competition
by German companies but minimal market penetration by other EU insurers.  More generally, an analysis by
Swiss Re (2000b) finds that personal lines insurance markets have remained localized but the ratio of
premiums to losses (a measure of insurance price) has declined since 1994 in ten of fifteen EU member
nations.  Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that competition in the Spanish insurance market has
intensified since deregulation, leading to efficiency gains.
Economies of Scale. As suggested above, the Spanish government’s policy of encouraging7
consolidation in the insurance industry was motivated by the presence of large numbers of very small firms
in the insurance market.  These firms were believed to be scale inefficient and not sufficiently robust to
compete effectively as the EU moved towards deregulation. It was argued that larger insurers would provide
better value and service to insurance customers in Spain and would be more competitive with other EU
insurers.  Thus, the policy change was based on the implicit (and untested) assumptions that there were
significant unrealized scale economies in the industry and that creating larger firms would lead to more viable
insurers and a more competitive market. Our tests are designed to provide information on whether these
critical assumptions were correct and whether further consolidation is likely to be beneficial. 
Economies of scale are present if average costs per unit of output decline as the volume of output
increases. The usual source of scale economies is the spreading of the firm’s fixed costs over a larger volume
of output.  Fixed costs are present for insurers due to the need for relatively fixed factors of production such
as computer systems, managerial expertise, and financial capital.  Economies of scale also can arise if
operating at larger scale permits managers to become more specialized and therefore more proficient in
carrying out specific tasks.  Operating at larger scale can reduce the firm’s cost of capital if income volatility
is inversely related to size.  This source of scale economies may be particularly applicable to insurers, because
the essence of insurance is risk diversification through pooling. These arguments lead to  the prediction that
insurance operations are likely to encounter ranges of production characterized by increasing returns to scale,
permitting some insurers to reduce unit costs by increasing production, at least within limits.
   Entry and Exit.  According to microeconomic theory, firms that do not succeed in minimizing costs
will not be able to adequately compensate factors of production and will be forced to exit the market.
Although several studies of financial institutions have shown that inefficient firms may be able to survive over
periods of time as long as five or ten years (e.g., Berger, et al. 2000, Cummins and Weiss 1993), we expect
that inefficient firms eventually will be forced either to improve their performance or to exit the market,
especially during a period of deregulation and increasing competitive intensity.  Likewise, a market where a
significant proportion of total output is provided by inefficient firms and where entry barriers have been8
reduced or eliminated is expected to attract new entrants, potentially improving market efficiency.  
Entry and exit have the potential to improve market efficiency in four major ways. First,  consolidation
has the potential to improve overall market efficiency by enabling acquiring firms to realize economies of
scale. This leads to the prediction that consolidation has improved scale efficiency in the Spanish insurance
market. Second, there is also likely to be a relationship between efficiency and the probability of being an
M&A target. If Spanish M&As primarily aim at increasing the size and market share of acquiring firms, then
one would expect acquirers to prefer acquisition targets that are relatively efficient, because the costs of
integrating an efficient firm into the acquiring firm are likely to be lower than for an inefficient target.  On the
other hand, if M&As are motivated because acquiring firms believe they can add value by improving the
performance of the target firm’s operations, then we might observe an inverse relationship between efficiency
and the probability that a firm becomes a merger target, provided that target firms also have some attractive
operating characteristics.  However, because much of the merger activity in Spain seems to have been
motivated by the objectives of increasing size and market share, on balance we expect to observe a positive
relationship between firm efficiency and the probability of being a merger target. That is, if numerous efficient
and inefficient potential target firms are present in a market, it seems reasonable to predict that the efficient
firms are more likely to be acquired.  
Third, based on the theoretical prediction that inefficient firms will not be able to survive in the long-
run, we expect firms that exit the market due to voluntary or involuntary liquidation to be relatively inefficient
and/or to exhibit signs of financial weakness. This leads to the prediction of an inverse relationship between
efficiency and the probability of non-merger exit, and we also expect firm financial performance measures
such as the equity capital-to-asset ratio to be inversely related to the probability of non-merger exit. Finally,
M&As are expected to be efficiency-improving if acquiring firms are more efficient than acquisition targets
or, minimally, no less efficient than the average firm in the industry.  Accordingly, we hypothesize a non-
negative relationship between efficiency and the probability of being an acquirer. We test these predictions
by estimating probit models for the probability of a firm’s being an acquisition target, exiting the market for9
7The sample primarily consists of Spanish insurers and Spanish subsidiaries of insurers licensed in other
EU countries. As in other EU nations, the primary method for foreign insurers to enter the Spanish market has
been through the formation of Spanish-licensed and regulated subsidiaries rather than through branches or
agencies (Berger, et al. 2001). Consequently, the sample consists of firms writing the vast majority of insurance
sold in Spain.  A small number of branches of EU licensed firms are included in the sample from 1989-1994, but
such branches did not have to report to the Spanish regulatory authority after 1994.  A few branches of  non-EU
firms, which are required to report to the Spanish regulator, also are included in the sample.  Conducting the
analysis without the branches does not materially change the results.
8Social benefit institutions (mutualidades de prevision social) are non-profit private mutual insurers
providing coverage complementary to social security schemes.  We omitted these firms because of their
specialized objective and because we wanted to focus on the for-profit segment of the insurance market.
other reasons, or participating in the M&A market as an acquirer. 
  3.  Data and Methodology
This section describes our data base and discusses the measurement of the outputs, inputs, and input
prices used in estimating efficiency. We then briefly discuss frontier efficiency concepts and explain the data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist approaches used to measure efficiency and productivity. 
The Data, Outputs, and Inputs
The Database.  The database for our study consists of financial statements for all insurers operating
in Spain over the period 1989-1998 that report to the Spanish regulatory authority, the Dirección General de
Seguros, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
7 The data base thus includes all insurers in the Spanish market
supervised by the Spanish regulatory authority except for social benefit institutions.
8  Some firms were
eliminated from the sample because of data problems such as zero or negative premiums or net worth, i.e.,
firms that do not appear to be viable operating entities.  The firms remaining in the sample account for at least
90 percent of premium volume in the Spanish insurance market in each year of the sample period.
Outputs.  Insurers are analogous to other financial firms in that their outputs consist primarily of
services, many of which are intangible.  Consistent with most of the recent literature on financial institutions,
we adopt a modified version of the value-added approach to output measurement, which counts as important
outputs those that have significant value added, as judged using operating cost allocations (Berger and
Humphrey 1992).  Insurers provide three principal services:10
9The use of premiums generally is not considered appropriate because premiums represent price times
quantity of output, i.e., insurance revenues (Yuengert 1993).  However, robustness checks conducted in prior
studies reveal that the efficiency estimates are not materially affected by the use of alternative output proxies
such as premiums (Cummins, et al. 1999).
! Risk-pooling and risk-bearing.  Insurance  provides a mechanism through which consumers and
businesses exposed to losses can engage in risk reduction through pooling. The actuarial, underwriting,
and related expenses incurred in risk pooling are important components of value added in the industry.
Insurers also add value by holding equity capital to bear the residual risk of the pool.
! "Real" financial services relating to insured losses.  Insurers provide a variety of real services
for policyholders including financial planning, risk management, and the provision of legal defense
in liability disputes. By contracting with insurers to provide these services, policyholders take
advantage of insurers'  specialized expertise to reduce the costs associated with managing risks.
! Intermediation.  For life insurers, financial intermediation is a principal function, accomplished
through the sale of asset accumulation products such as annuities. For non-life insurers, intermediation
is an important but incidental function, resulting from the collection of premiums in advance of claim
payments. Insurers’ value added from intermediation is reflected in the net interest margin between
the rate of return earned on invested assets and the rate credited to policyholders. 
Transactions flow data such as the number of applications processed, the number of policies issued,
the number of claims settled, etc. are not publicly available for insurers. However, a satisfactory proxy for the
amount of risk-pooling and real insurance services provided is the value of real losses incurred (Berger,
Cummins, and Weiss 1997, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 1999).
9  Losses incurred are defined as the losses that
are expected to be paid as the result of providing insurance coverage during a particular period of time.
Because the objective of risk-pooling is to collect funds from the policyholder pool and redistribute them to
those who incur losses, proxying output by the amount of losses incurred seems quite appropriate.  Losses are
also a good proxy for the amount of real services provided, since the amount of claims settlement and risk
management services also are highly correlated with loss aggregates.  Because the types of services provided
differ between the principal types of insurance, we use as separate output measures the value of life and non-
life insurance losses incurred.  Losses incurred and all other monetary values used in the study are expressed
in 1986 monetary units by deflating by the Spanish Consumer Price Index (Indice de Precios al Consumo, from
the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)).
Losses incurred are a satisfactory measure of output for coverage provided during any given year.11
10Reserves in insurance represent the insurer’s best estimate of claims to be paid in the future as a result
of past events (non-life insurance) or future contingencies (life insurance).
11 Only a small fraction of expenses are for physical capital such as computers. Consequently, we do not
define physical capital as a separate input but include it in the business services category.
However, insurers also perform services in connection with claims occurring in prior years that have not yet
been settled or, in the case of life insurance, claims resulting from contingent events (e.g., mortality) expected
to occur in the future.  As a proxy for these services, we use the real value of policy reserves maintained by
the industry.
10 Because the types of services provided in the reinsurance market differ from those provided in
the primary insurance market, we include as separate outputs the real values of reinsurance reserves and
reserves for primary insurance contracts.  Our final output variable, which proxies for the intermediation
function, is the real value of invested assets.
Inputs and Input Prices.  We follow the recent insurance efficiency literature in defining four inputs
– labor, business services (including materials and physical capital), financial debt capital, and equity capital.
Labor is the most important non-interest expense for the Spanish insurance industry, accounting for about two-
thirds of total non-loss expenses. The price of labor is the average monthly wage for employees in the
insurance sector, provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).  Most of the remainder of insurer
expenses are for business services such as legal fees, travel, communications, and materials; and we use
business services as a second output.
11  The Spanish business services deflator compiled by the INE is used
as the price of business services.
Because data on the number of employees or hours worked in the Spanish insurance industry are not
available, we follow other insurance efficiency researchers (e.g, Cummins and Weiss 1993, Berger, Cummins,
and Weiss 1997, Cummins and Zi 1998) in measuring the quantity of labor by dividing labor expenditures by
the insurance sector wage rate. The quantity of business services is defined similarly.
Our other inputs are the quantity of financial equity capital and debt capital (borrowed funds).
Financial equity capital is an important input in insurance because insurers must hold equity to ensure12
12It would be preferable to vary both the cost of equity and the cost of debt capital by insurer depending
upon capital structure and portfolio risk.  However, the data to do this are not available.  As a robustness check,
we also estimated efficiency by creating three tiers of insurers, with differing costs of debt capital based upon
their capital to asset ratios, giving insurers with lower capital to asset ratios higher costs of debt.  The results
indicated that the efficiency scores and efficiency rankings are not substantially affected by the choice of interest
rate assumption.  As additional controls for cost of capital differences in capital structure among firms, we
include the ratios of equity and debt capital to assets in our probit regression analysis, as explained below.
policyholders that they will receive payment if claims exceed expectations and to satisfy regulatory
requirements.  Debt capital provides another source of funds, consisting of borrowed funds as well as deposits
from reinsurance companies to guarantee the reinsurers’ promise to pay claims on ceded risks.  Capital costs
represent a significant expense for insurers. However, measuring the cost of capital in the Spanish insurance
industry is difficult because few insurers have traded shares.  As a proxy for the cost of equity capital, we use
the rate of total return on the Madrid Stock Exchange Index for each year of the sample period; and for debt
capital we use the one-year Spanish Treasury bill rate.
12 
Summary. To summarize, we use five outputs and four inputs.  The outputs are non-life insurance
losses incurred, life insurance losses incurred, reinsurance reserves,  reserves for primary insurance contracts,
and invested assets.  The inputs are labor, business services, debt capital, and equity capital.  
Frontier Efficiency Concepts
To measure efficiency in the Spanish insurance industry, we utilize modern frontier efficiency analysis
(Lovell 1993, Grosskopf 1993).  This technique involves measuring the performance of each firm in the
industry relative to “best practice” efficient frontiers. Efficiency scores vary between zero and 1, with fully
efficient firms having efficiencies equal to 1 and inefficient firms having efficiencies between zero and 1.  This
section provides a brief overview of the frontier efficiency methodology. 
We estimate efficient production and cost frontiers, providing measures of cost, technical, and
allocative efficiency for each firm in our sample.  Cost efficiency for a given firm is defined as the ratio of the
costs of a fully efficient firm  (i.e., a firm operating on the efficient cost frontier) with the same output
quantities and input prices to the given firm’s actual costs.  One minus a firm’s efficiency ratio provides a13
measures of the proportion by which costs could be reduced if the firm were operating on the cost frontier.
Firms achieve cost efficiency by adopting the best practice technology (becoming technically efficient) and
choosing the optimal mix of inputs (becoming allocatively efficient), conditional on outputs and input prices.
Technical efficiency for a given firm is defined as the ratio of the input usage of a fully efficient firm
producing the same output vector to the input usage of the firm under consideration.  Technical efficiency can
be decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency.  Pure technical efficiency is measured
relative to a variable returns to scale (VRS) production frontier, i.e., a frontier characterized by increasing,
constant, and/or decreasing returns to scale. Firms operating on the VRS frontier are considered fully efficient
in the pure technical sense.  If the firm is operating with increasing or decreasing returns to scale, it can
improve its efficiency by moving to a constant returns to scale frontier, i.e., by becoming scale efficient.
Technical efficiency can be shown to equal the product of pure technical and scale efficiency.
Allocative efficiency measures the firm’s success in choosing the cost minimizing combination of
inputs.  Cost efficiency can be shown to equal the product of technical and allocative efficiency.  Therefore,
to be fully cost efficient, a firm must be both technically and allocatively efficient.
Estimation Methodology
We estimate efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Charnes, et al. 1994).  DEA is a non-
parametric approach that does not require the specification of a production or cost function but rather
computes efficient “best practice” production and cost frontiers based on linear combinations of firms in the
industry.  DEA has been widely used in recent years to estimate efficiency in a variety of industries and
national markets.  We consider it appropriate to analyze insurance because a paper by Cummins and Zi (1998)
provides evidence that DEA estimates of efficiency for U.S. life insurers are more highly correlated with
conventional performance measures such as expense to premium ratios and return on assets than are the
estimates obtained using econometric production and cost functions.  
A second reason for choosing DEA as our estimation methodology is that the Malmquist approach,
which has become a standard methodology for estimating the evolution of productivity and efficiency over14
13Although a parametric distance function approach has been developed by Fuentes, Grifell-Tatjé, and
Perelman (2001), their approach is based on the translog functional form.  Use of the translog for our data would
create problems in dealing with specializing firms that have zero values for some outputs. Zero outputs are not
a problem in DEA. The problems of dealing with zero outputs using the translog are discussed in Pulley and
Humphrey (1993).
(1)
          (2)
time, is conveniently implemented using DEA.
13 Thus, relying on DEA permits us to use the same
methodology consistently throughout the paper rather than using the non-parametric approach for some of our
estimates and the econometric approach for others. A third important reason for using DEA is that it provides
a particularly convenient method for decomposing cost efficiency into allocative, pure technical, and scale
efficiency, and thus facilitates our analysis of scale economies.
Technical Efficiency.  To measure technical efficiency we employ the input distance function
introduced by Shephard (1970).  Suppose producer i uses input vector xi = ( x1i, x2i,..., xKi )
T  0 ú+
K  to produce
output vector yi = ( y1i, y2i,..., yNi)
T  0 ú+
N, where K is the number of inputs, N is the number of outputs, and
T denotes vector transpose. A production technology which transforms inputs into outputs can be modeled by
an input correspondence y 6 V(y) f ú+
K.  For any y  0 ú+
N,  V(y) denotes the subset of all input vectors x
0  ú+
k  which yield at least y. The input-oriented distance function is defined by
The input-oriented distance function is the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional contraction of the
input vector xi, given outputs yi, i.e., Farrell's (1957) measure of input technical efficiency.  Input technical
efficiency TE(xi,yi) is therefore defined as TE(xi,yi) = 1/D(xi,yi).  Technical efficiency is estimated separately
for each firm in the sample by solving the following linear programming problem:
subject to:  Y 8i $ yi 15
(3)
X 8i # 2i xi
    8i $ 0
where X is a K x I input matrix and Y an N x I output matrix for all sample firms, xi is a K x 1 input vector
and yi an N x 1 output vector of firm i, 8i is an I x 1 intensity vector (the inequalities are interpreted as applying
to each row of the relevant matrix), and I = the number of firms in the sample (i = 1, 2, . . ., I).  This estimation
produces a constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier.  The frontiers are estimated year by year, producing a best
practice production frontier for each year of the sample period.
The next step is to decompose technical efficiency into its components, pure technical efficiency and
scale efficiency, where TE(xi,yi) = PT(xi,yi)*SE(xi,yi), PT(xi,yi) = pure technical efficiency, and SE(xi,yi) =
scale efficiency. Pure technical and scale efficiency are separated by solving (2) with the additional constraint:
3i8i = 1 for a variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier, and again with the constraint 3i 8i # 1for a non-
increasing returns to scale (NIRS) frontier.  Pure technical efficiency (PT) is the solution to the VRS problem,
and scale efficiency is then obtained as SE(xi,yi) = TE(xi,yi)/PT(xi,yi).  If SE(xi,yi) = 1, CRS are indicated. If
S … 1 and NIRS efficiency = PT, decreasing returns to scale (DRS) are present; whereas if S … 1 and the NIRS
efficiency measure … PT, then increasing returns to scale (IRS) are indicated.
Cost Efficiency.  To estimate cost efficiency for our sample firms, we use a two-step procedure.  For
firm i, let wi = (w1i, w2i, . . . , wKi)
T denote the input price vector corresponding to the input vector xi. Then, we
first solve the following problem:
S
u
bject to   Y 8i $ yi 
X 8i # xi
    8i $ 016
14It would be possible, for example, for year t+j’s frontier to dominate that of year t but for the average
score to be higher in year t than in year t+j, i.e., firms could be positioned closer to the frontier in period t but
that frontier could be dominated by the frontier for period t+j.  
The solution vector xi* is the cost minimizing input vector for the input price vector wi and the output vector
yi. Second, calculate the ratio 0i = wi
Txi*/wi
Txi  to obtain the cost efficiency  measure for firm i.  The measure
of cost efficiency for firm i, 0 < 0i # 1 , is interpreted as the proportion by which the firm could multiply its
costs and still produce no less of any output.  We solve (3) for each firm in the sample for each year, producing
a best practice cost frontier for each year of the sample period.
Cost efficiency is the product of technical and allocative efficiency. Thus, having estimates of cost
efficiency and technical efficiency enables us to back out estimates of allocative efficiency using the
relationship: AE(xi,yi) = CE(xi,yi)/TE(xi,yi), where CE(xi,yi) = cost efficiency, TE(xi,yi) = technical efficiency,
and AE(xi,yi) = allocative efficiency, evaluated at input-output vector (xi,yi).
Malmquist Analysis. If consolidation in the Spanish insurance industry has been beneficial, we would
expect the Malmquist indices to reveal positive shifts in the production frontier and/or changes in technical
efficiency over the sample period.  Malmquist analysis permits us to separate shifts in the frontier (technical
change) from improvements in efficiency relative to the frontier (technical efficiency change).  The product
of technical change and technical efficiency change, total factor productivity change, is measured by the
Malmquist index (for further details, see Grosskopf 1993).  
Technical change and technical efficiency change cannot be measured accurately using trends in
annual average efficiency scores because the average scores are based on separate frontiers estimated for each
year of the sample period.
14 The Malmquist approach avoids this problem of interpretation by also measuring
each firm’s position in year t+j (t) relative to the frontier of period t (t+j). To illustrate the Malmquist
approach, consider the production frontiers for a single input, single output firm in Figure 1.  The line labeled
0V
t in the figure represents the production frontier in period t, whereas 0V
t+1 represents the frontier in period
t+1.  The improved technology represented by 0V
t+1 enables efficient firms to produce any level of output17
15We drop the subscript i to conserve notation, but the optimization is still conducted for a specific firm.
16Notice that cross-frontier distance function estimates can be less than 1, whereas distance function
estimates for a given year’s input-output bundle relative to the frontier for the same year must be $ 1.  For
example, a distance function value less than one for D
t(xi
t+1,yi
t+1) implies that the specified input-output
combination is infeasible using the technology of period t.
using less of the input than was required by technology 0V
t . 
Suppose that the hypothetical firm has input-output combination (xi
t,yi
t) in period t and (xi
t+1,yi
t+1) in
period t+1.  Two principal changes have occurred between period t and period t+1.  First, because of technical
progress, the firm produces more output per unit of input in period t+1 than in period t. In fact,  its input-output
combination in period t+1 would have been infeasible using period t technology.  Thus, technical change has
taken place.  Second, the firm has experienced technical efficiency change because it is operating closer to the
frontier in t+1 than it was in period t.  The Malmquist approach measures both improvements in technology
and changes in efficiency relative to the frontiers for different time periods.
To define the Malmquist index for the production frontier, we modify equation (1) to incorporate time











the input and output vectors at time t (t+1).  In equation (4) the input-output bundle in time period t+1 is
evaluated relative to the technology of period t; while in equation (5) the input-output bundle in period t is
evaluated relative to the technology of time t+1. In Figure 1, D
t+1(xi
t,yi





The distance functions (equations (4) and (5)) are estimated by solving linear programming problems similar
to problem (2). 
Malmquist indices can be defined relative to either the technology in period t or the technology in18
(7)
period t+1, as follows:
(6)
where M
t measures productivity growth between periods t and t+1 using the technology in period t as the
reference technology, while M
t+1 measures productivity growth with respect to the technology in period t+1.
To avoid an arbitrary choice of reference technology, the input-oriented Malmquist index of total factor
productivity is defined as the geometric mean of M
t and M
t+1 (Grosskopf 1993): 
In Figure 1, the total factor productivity index is equal to {[(0a/0b)/(0e/0d)][(0a/0c)/(0e/0f)]}
½ .
The Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed into measures of technical efficiency 
change and technical change, by factoring as follows:
(8)
The first ratio in equation (8), in parentheses, represents technical efficiency change, i.e., the relative distance
of the input-output bundle from the frontier in periods t and t+1. Recall that both the numerator and
denominator of this ratio must be $ 1 and that values closer to 1 represent higher efficiency.  Thus, if technical
efficiency is higher in period t+1 than in period t, the value of this ratio will be > 1; while if efficiency declines
between the two periods, the value of the ratio will be < 1.  In terms of Figure 1, technical efficiency change
is measured as the ratio [(0a/0b)/(0e/0f)].  
The second factor in equation (8), in brackets, is a geometric mean representing technical change
(shifts in the frontier) between periods t and t+1.  Values of the second factor > 1 imply technical progress and
values < 1 imply technical regress.  Intuitively, the bracketed factor represents the distance between the period
t and period t+1 frontiers.  The distance between the frontiers at output level y
t is 0b/0c, and the distance19
17The number of firms in the “Total Premiums” section of the table does not equal the sum of the number
of firms in the life and non-life sections of the table because the number of firms in the latter two sections of the
table includes specialist firms as well as  diversified firms offering both types of insurance.  The table omits six
“depository” firms, a somewhat unusual organizational form which disappeared from the market by 1994. 
between the frontiers at output level y
t+1 is 0d/0f.  The Malmquist index of technical change (the bracketed
expression in (8)) is the geometric mean of these two distances, i.e., [(0b/0c) (0d/0f)]
½.
4. Results 
This section presents our results on the effects of deregulation in the Spanish insurance market. We
begin by tracing changes in the numbers of firms and market concentration over the sample period. The
efficiency results are then presented, including our analysis of scale economies. We next discuss mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) and present  probit regressions, with zero-one dependent variables, respectively, for
M&A target firms, firms exiting the market for other reasons, and firms participating in the M&A market as
acquirers. Finally, we discuss the results of the Malmquist total factor productivity analysis.
Concentration Trends and Efficiency  
A statistical summary of market structure in the Spanish insurance industry is presented in Table 1.
The table shows four, eight, and twenty-firm concentration ratios for non-life insurers, life insurers, and the
entire industry, based on premium revenues.  Numbers of firms and Herfindahl indices are also shown. The
number of firms in the industry fell dramatically over the sample period, due to firm retirements, insolvencies,
mergers, and acquisitions. The number of companies offering non-life insurance fell from 436 to 280, and the
number offering life insurance declined from 159 to 116.  The total number of firms in the industry fell by 35
percent (from 508 to 331) over the sample period.
17
Concentration generally increased in the non-life insurance segment of the Spanish insurance industry.
The twenty-firm concentration ratio increased from 47.3 percent in 1989 to 59.6 percent in 1998; and the
Herfindahl index rose from 163.0 to 237.9.  In contrast, concentration declined in the life insurance segment
of the Spanish insurance industry, with the four-firm concentration ratio falling from 40.9 percent in 1990 to20
18The life insurance and total concentration statistics are affected in 1989 and 1994 by large amounts of
single premium (prima única) life insurance policies issued in those years. Single premium policies are purchased
with one up-front premium rather than periodical premiums as in most types of insurance. The surge in 1989 was
caused by the removal of a tax advantage for life insurance purchases in the last half of the year, and the surge
in 1994 followed the externalization of internal employee funds to insurance or pension funds. 
19All monetary valued variables are expressed in millions of constant 1986 pesetas based on the Spanish
consumer price index. 
20However, it would not be correct to conclude that Spanish insurers are less efficient than insurers in
the U.S., because the efficiency scores are taken from different frontiers.  It would be possible, for example, for
most Spanish insurers to be inefficient relative to the Spanish frontier and simultaneously for the Spanish frontier
21.4 percent in 1998 and the Herfindahl index falling from 669.9 in 1990 to 290.1 in 1998.
18  The decline is
attributable to smaller firms and new entrants gaining market share at the expense of the large firms that
traditionally dominated the industry. Because the industry totals represent the aggregation of the life and non-
life results, overall concentration remained relatively constant over the sample period.
Summary statistics on outputs, inputs, and input prices are shown in Table 2.
19  Average firm size in
terms of invested assets grew by 275.5 percent, from 5.2 billion to 19.5 billion pesetas. The output category
with the highest growth rate was invested assets, which increased by 124.7 percent over the sample period.
As percentages of total input expenditures, labor, debt capital expenditures, and equity capital expenditures
declined and business services expenditures increased. This is suggestive of technological advances, because
information technology expenditures are included in the business services category.  As a first indication of
market productivity gains, we find that the total value of outputs increased by 91.9 percent over the sample
period, while total input expenditures increased by only 56.6 percent. 
The efficiency results are presented in Table 3, which shows average efficiencies for the entire sample
as well as by asset size quartile.  Averages are shown for cost efficiency and its components – pure technical,
allocative, and scale efficiency.   At this stage, we focus on the efficiency results for the entire sample.  The
size quartile results are discussed below as part of the analysis of economies of scale.  
Cost efficiencies for Spanish insurers are low relative to those estimated by prior researchers for non-
life and life insurers in the United States (Cummins and Weiss 1993, Cummins and Zi 1998).
20 The21
to dominate frontiers formed by insurers in other countries.  A correct  conclusion is that Spanish insurers on
average are less efficient relative to their own best practice frontier than are U.S. insurers relative to their frontier.
(unweighted) average cost efficiency was 15.5% in 1989 and 22.7% in 1998. The results imply that the average
Spanish insurer could have reduced its costs by 77.3% in 1998 by operating on the efficient frontier.  Clearly,
there are significant opportunities for efficiency gains in this market, and it is doubtful that the least efficient
firms will be able to survive in the long-run unless they significantly improve their performance. 
   The average technical efficiency (the product of pure technical and scale efficiency) for Spanish
insurers in 1998 is 53.6%.  This is about the same as the technical efficiency of insurers in France and Austria,
higher than for insurers in Germany, and lower than for insurers in Italy (Fecher, et al. 1993; Mahlberg and
Url 1998, 2000; and Cummins, et al. 1997, respectively).  Scale efficiency for Spanish insurers in 1998
averages 89.3%, which is somewhat higher than scale efficiencies for Austrian and German insurers  reported
in Mahlberg and Url (1998, 2000).  Therefore, the dispersion of Spanish insurers relatively to the Spanish best
practice frontiers is generally comparable to that found by prior researchers for other EU insurers, relative to
their own national frontiers. Prior researchers have not provided estimates of cost or allocative efficiency for
European insurance firms.
The decomposition of Spanish insurers’ cost efficiency reveals that the most severe efficiency loss
occurs as a result of allocative inefficiency, which averages only 41.2% in 1998, suggesting that Spanish
insurers on average do not do a very good job in choosing the cost minimizing combination of inputs.  This
is characteristic of a market that has been sheltered from competition.  The second major source of efficiency
loss among Spanish insurers arises from pure technical inefficiency, i.e., the failure of the average insurer to
operate on the production frontier. This type of efficiency averaged 60.0% in 1998. Technical inefficiency is
an especially serious limitation in a period of rapid technological change, suggesting that many Spanish
insurers must improve their technical performance dramatically to remain in the market.  Scale efficiency,
discussed in more detail below, is relatively high, averaging 89.3% percent in 1998. 
Economies of Scale22
If a market contains firms operating with increasing and decreasing returns to scale, market efficiency
can be increased if more firms attain constant returns to scale because fewer resources are wasted due to firms
being either too small or too large. Accordingly, if the Spanish government’s policy of encouraging M&As
has been beneficial, we expect the proportion of firms operating with increasing returns to scale to decrease
(IRS) over the sample period, the proportion operating with constant returns to scale (CRS) to increase, and/or
the proportion operating with decreasing returns to scale (DRS) to decline.
To explore the issue of scale economies, we first consider the average efficiency scores by firm size
quartile, shown in Table 3.  The size quartiles in the table are based on total assets, with quartile 1 (Q1)
containing the smallest firms and quartile 4 (Q4) the largest. 
In eight of the ten years in the sample period and for the period as a whole, there is a monotonic
relationship between cost efficiency and size quartile, with larger firms tending to be more cost efficient. E.g.,
in 1998, cost efficiency averaged 19.7% for quartile 1 insurers and 30.0% for quartile 4 insurers. The
decomposition of cost efficiency into allocative, pure technical, and scale efficiency reveals that the large-firm
cost efficiency advantage is primarily attributable to pure technical efficiency, which averages nearly 25
percentage points higher for Q4 insurers than for insurers in the next most efficient quartile for the sample
period as a whole, and is no less than 17 percentage points higher for each individual year.  Thus, large
insurers primarily define the production frontier, suggesting a significant advantage in employing technology.
At least in this important dimension, bigger is better in the Spanish insurance industry.
However, further analysis of efficiency by size quartile shows that a high proportion of the large
insurers’ advantage in pure technical efficiency is lost due to allocative and scale inefficiency.  The Q4 insurers
have about the same average allocative efficiencies as insurers in the other three size quartiles, suggesting that
any advantages conveyed by larger scale in terms of selecting optimal input quantities tend to be offset by the
difficulties of allocating resources in larger and more complex organizations.  
The scale efficiencies by size quartile, plotted in Figure 2, provide important information regarding
the Spanish government’s policy of encouraging insurance industry consolidation. The figure shows that firms23
in the smallest quartile (Q1) are clearly much less scale efficient than firms in the three larger quartiles (Q2,
Q3, and Q4), suggesting that many Q1 firms are operating with increasing returns to scale. Thus, the
government policy makes sense if it enables small firms to attain more efficient scale, encourages the merger
of such firms into larger entities, or gives small firms the incentive to exit the market.  However, Figure 2 also
suggests that there are limits to the efficiency gains from consolidation. Firms in Q4 are less scale efficient
than firms in Q2 and Q3, suggesting that many large firms may be operating with DRS. 
Further analysis of scale economies is provided in Figure 3, which shows the proportions of insurers
operating with IRS, CRS, and DRS by year from 1989-1998. The proportion of firms in the IRS region
declined significantly over the sample period, from 68 percent in 1989 to about 47 percent in 1998.  The
proportion of firms in the CRS region increased only slightly over the period, from 11 percent in 1989 to 15
percent in 1998, but the proportion in the DRS region increased from 21 percent to 38 percent over the sample
period.  Thus, although consolidation has reduced the proportion of firms characterized by unrealized scale
economies, it has also increased the proportion of firms realizing scale diseconomies.
Analysis of scale economies in 1998 provides some guidance regarding the size categories where IRS
tend to be replaced by DRS. Figures 4 and 5 show economies of scale by asset size decile for non-life and life
insurers, respectively.  The average firm size in each size decile is shown on the horizontal axis. For non-life
insurers (Figure 4), the majority of firms tend to encounter DRS at about decile 8 (decile 1 is the smallest),
where the average firm size is 3.4 billion pesetas.  In decile 9, for example, only 10 percent of non-life insurers
operate with IRS and 78 percent operate with DRS.  For life insurers (Figure 5), the proportion of firms with
IRS drops to zero following decile 7, where the average firm size is 45.7 billion pesetas, and at least half the
firms in deciles 8, 9, and 10 operate with DRS. The results also suggest that the minimum efficient scale of
operations is considerably larger for life insurers than for non-life insurers.  However, about 30 percent of non-
life and 40 percent of life insurers in the largest size decile operate with CRS, suggesting that a significant
proportion of the largest firms have attained the optimal scale for their operations.  
The policy implication to be drawn from the scale economy analysis is that the Spanish government24
21The total number of entering and exiting firms in the Spanish market is larger than the number in our
sample because data were unavailable for some of the firms, e.g., branches of EU firms that do not have to report
to the Spanish regulatory authorities after 1994, or because the firms were eliminated from the sample due to data
quality problems, such as having zero or negative net worth or premiums.  However, other than EU branches after
1994, the sample firms are  the most significant firms operating in the Spanish market.  The categories of firms
by M&A status are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  E.g., an entering firm could acquire other firms after
entering the market or a firm could engage in acquisitions and then later be acquired by another firm or exit the
market for other reasons. For purposes of computing summary statistics, firms that entered or exited the market
were categorized as entering and exiting firms, respectively, even if they engaged in M&A activity as acquirers.
For purposes of regression analysis, dummy variables were specified, coded as “1" for each category applicable
to a given firm for the transaction year and all subsequent years.  Thus, firms were allowed to be in more than
one category.  E.g., a firm that entered the market in 1994 and acquired another firm in 1996 would be given a
“1" for the entry dummy variable in 1994-1998 and also a “1" for the acquirer dummy variable in 1996-1998.
Non-exclusivity affects only 91 out of 3831 observations in our data base.
should reassess the viability of encouraging further consolidation in the insurance industry for firms in the
largest size deciles.  However, there are still many small firms operating in the increasing returns to scale
segment of the cost curve, so that continued consolidation of smaller firms may yield efficiency gains.  
Entry and Exit 
Our analysis of entry and exit breaks down the firms in the industry into five categories – (1) Firms
acquired by other firms (M&A target firms), (2) firms withdrawing from the market for other reasons such as
insolvency or voluntary liquidation (“other exiting” firms), (3) firms entering the market, (4) firms
participating in the M&A market as acquirers, and (5) firms remaining in the market that have not engaged
in M&A activity (non-M&A firms).
21 As discussed above, M&A target firms are expected to display some
favorable characteristics that attract acquirers. Firms withdrawing from the market for non-M&A reasons are
expected to be less efficient than average and also to have other undesirable financial characteristics. Entering
firms are expected to be relatively inefficient to the extent that there are unusual fixed costs, a steep learning
curve, or other start-up costs that are incurred before the firm becomes fully competitive.  Such costs are likely
to diminish over time. Thus, entrants might be expected to achieve larger productivity gains than incumbent
firms. If consolidation is motivated by efficiency considerations, acquirers should be no less efficient than
average and ideally would be more efficient than average. Finally, non-M&A firms are expected to be more
efficient than entering firms and “other exiting” firms.25
22Even though our overall sample period is 1989-1998, data on market entry and exit for 1998 were not
readily available, so the entry and exit analysis ends with 1997.
The entry and exit experience for the firms in our sample is summarized in Table 4A.
22 The sample
includes one hundred thirty-two insurers that exited the market from 1989-1997 – 100 due to M&A activity
and 32 for other reasons. The sample also includes 30 firms that entered the market during the sample period.
The total number of firms in the sample declined from 447 in 1989 to 328 in 1997.  
Pair-wise t-tests for differences between average efficiency scores for the categories of firms in Table
4A are shown in Table 4B. Table 4B shows that M&A targets tend to have higher cost and scale efficiencies
than “other exiting” firms, higher cost and pure technical efficiency than entering firms, higher allocative
efficiency than acquiring firms, and higher scale efficiency than non-M&A firms. This suggests that Spanish
M&As occur primarily because acquiring firms are seeking scale economies and market share rather than
trying to add value by rehabilitating inefficient targets.  Besides being less cost and scale efficient than M&A
targets, “other exiting” firms are also less scale efficient than acquirers and less cost and scale efficient than
non-M&A firms. Thus, consolidation has resulted in the removal of inefficient firms from the market. 
Entering firms have significantly lower cost and pure technical efficiency but higher allocative
efficiency than acquirers and non-M&A firms, and lower cost and pure technical efficiency than target firms.
Thus, there appears to be a learning curve for new entrants in implementing technology, but such firms
perform relatively well in choosing the cost minimizing combination of inputs.  These univariate results must
be interpreted with some caution, however, because they do not control other potentially influential factors,
providing the rationale for the multi-variate probit analysis discussed below.
Summary statistics and t-tests by entry-exit status are shown in Tables 5A and 5B.  Firms exiting the
market for non-M&A reasons are significantly smaller in terms of total assets than the other four groups of
firms.  Such firms are also significantly smaller in terms of premiums than targets, acquiring firms, and non-
M&A firms. Target firms are significantly smaller than acquirers, as expected if firms with more financial
resources tend to succeed in the acquisitions market.  The results thus provide evidence the Spanish26
government’s consolidation policy has succeeded in removing relatively small firms from the market. 
There are also a number of indications that “other exiting” firms were weaker financially than M&A
target firms and firms remaining in the market.  The other exiting firms had the highest average debt capital-to-
asset ratio among the five categories of firms, and the difference is statistically significant with respect to new
entrants, acquirers, and non-M&A firms.  The other exiting firms also had significantly lower return on equity
(ROE) than target firms, acquirers, and non-M&A firms and are the only category for which average ROE is
negative. The other exiting firms also had significantly lower ratios of invested assets to total assets than
acquirers and non-M&A firms, suggesting poor cash management and/or credit problems with receivables.
These results provide evidence that consolidation in the Spanish insurance market has raised the average level
of financial quality of the firms in the industry by eliminating relatively weak insurers.
M&A Probit Regressions  
Probit regressions to identify the characteristics of M&A target firms, “other exiting” firms, and
acquirers are presented in Table 6. In each probit model, the dependent variable is equal to 1 for the firms
falling in the category under analysis and equal to zero otherwise. 
Efficiency scores are included as explanatory variables in the equations to provide information on the
relationship between efficiency and a firm’s status as a target, other exiting firm, or acquirer.  Several control
variables are also included in the equations.  These include a dummy variable for organizational form, set
equal to 1 for stock firms and to zero otherwise. Because the Spanish insurance market includes specializing
in life and non-life insurance as well as diversified firms offering both types of insurance, we include dummy
variables set equal to one, respectively, for life and non-life specialist firms and to zero otherwise. The natural
log of premiums is used to control for firm size, and the ratios of equity capital and debt capital to assets are
included to control for capital structure. Return on equity is included to control for profitability.  Year dummy
variables are also included in the equations to provide information on differences in M&A status probabilities
over time. 
The M&A target firm equation shows that firms which are more allocatively and scale efficient are27
23It is possible for mutuals to be acquired, even though they do not have ownership shares that can be
bought and sold.  Mutual acquisitions are more expensive because regulators must be convinced that the rights
of the policyholders, who at least nominally own the firm, are protected.  
significantly more likely to be M&A targets.  The pure technical efficiency variable is negative but not
statistically significant.  The results thus suggest that acquiring firms seek targets that are allocatively and/or
scale efficient but not necessarily technically efficient. Considering that acquirers tend to be large (Table 5)
and that large firms in Spain are much more technically efficient than smaller firms (Table 3), acquirers may
believe they can deal with technical efficiency problems of target firms but prefer targets to be relatively
efficient along other dimensions. There is an inverse relationship between the probability of being an M&A
target and the debt capital-to-assets ratio, i.e., suggesting that acquirers tend to avoid highly leveraged firms.
The findings that allocative and scale efficiency are positively related to the probability of being acquired and
that leverage is negatively related supports the view that acquisitions in Spain tend to be focused on scale and
market share gains rather than adding value by improving the performance of inefficient firms. 
 Both the life and non-life specialist dummy variables are positive and statistically significant in the
M&A target equation, suggesting that specialist firms are more likely to be acquired than diversified firms.
Not surprisingly, stock firms are more likely to be acquired than mutuals because the existence of stock
provides a relatively low-cost mechanism for acquiring a target firm.
23 Finally, there is a monotonically
decreasing relationship between the probability of acquisition and the year dummy variables. This makes sense
if there are fewer firms with desirable M&A characteristics after the most attractive targets have been acquired
and/or if acquirers begin to encounter decreasing returns to scale.
Turning next to the probit model for the probability of exiting the market for non-M&A reasons, such
as insolvency or voluntary liquidation, we find that a firm’s allocative, pure technical, and scale efficiency are
inversely related to the probability of this type of market exit. This provides further evidence that market exit
has led to efficiency gains in the Spanish insurance market by removing inefficient firms from the market.  The
probability of non-M&A exit has a significant negative relationship with the equity capital-to-asset ratio and28
ROE, providing further evidence that non-M&A exits have eliminated under-performing firms.  The
probability of non-M&A exit also is inversely related to firm size, showing that exit is more probable for small
firms.  The life and non-life specialist dummy variables are significant and negative, implying that diversified
firms are more likely to exit for non-M&A reasons than specialists.  The coefficients of the year dummy
variables are negative, monotonically decreasing, and significant in the last six years of the sample period. This
suggests that the probability of non-M&A exit has declined over time as the smallest and weakest firms have
been eliminated.    
The final probit regression in Table 6 is for the probability of being an acquiring firm. The results
imply that acquiring firms tend to be larger (based on the log of premiums variable) and financially stronger
(based on the equity capital-to-assets variable) than non-acquirers. Stock firms also are more likely to be
acquirers than mutuals. These relationships suggest that firms with more overall resources, higher
capitalization, and superior access to capital markets are more likely to participate in the acquisitions market.
The significant negative coefficients of the life and non-life specialist dummy variables provide evidence that
diversified firms are more likely to be acquirers than specialists.  The year dummy variables are monotonically
increasing and significant for the last three years of the sample period.  A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that
the coefficients for 1994-1997 are equal to those in 1990-1993, providing evidence that the Third Generation
Insurance Directives increased the probability of Spanish insurer participation in the acquisitions market. 
Although the results in Table 6 provide several indications that consolidation has improved market
efficiency, there is also evidence that consolidation may not be wholly beneficial. Specifically, the scale
efficiency variable is negative and statistically significant in the acquirer equation, suggesting that scale
inefficient firms are more likely to be acquirers. This is perhaps not surprising, given that acquirers tend to be
relatively large firms, which are more likely to operate with decreasing returns to scale than smaller firms.
Thus, efficiency gains resulting from acquisitions may be at least partially offset by scale inefficiencies.
Malmquist Analysis 
We next turn to the Malmquist analysis of technical change and technical efficiency change over the29
24For example, in the adjacent-year sample, the 1990-1991 Malmquist analysis includes all firms that
were present in both 1990 and 1991 irrespective of whether they are present in the other years of the sample
period (1989 and 1992-1998).  
25The averages should be viewed as summary statistics because Malmquist indices do not “chain,”
i.e., the geometric mean of the nine two-year indices is not mathematically equivalent to the Malmquist
index comparing the beginning and ending years of the sample period. 
26In computing the averages for each two-year Malmquist index comparison, we omit observations above
the 99th and below the 1st percentile of Malmquist scores based on the complete panel annual estimates, i.e., we
pooled the individual firm results from the nine two-year comparison periods and then use the 99th and 1st
percentiles of this pooled sample as trimming criteria applied to each individual two-year comparison set. The
complete panel was used because it consists of relatively mature, stable firms that are less likely to be affected
by unusual financial results associated with market entry, exit, or unusual growth. This was done because some
of the scores were too high or too low to be credible.  The effect of this trimming of the results is to slightly
increase the estimates of TFP growth in the complete panel sample and to reduce somewhat the implied annual
sample period. Recall that Malmquist indices measure total factor productivity growth by considering
performance relative to production frontiers for two different years.  This requires that the identical sample
of firms be available in both comparison years, i.e., firms that entered or exited the market in one of the two
comparison years are excluded.  Because there has been significant entry and exit in this market over our
sample period, we conduct the Malmquist analysis using two samples – (1) the complete panel of firms that
were present in all of the years 1989 through 1998 (called the complete-panel sample); and (2) all firms that
were present in each of the adjacent two-year comparison periods (called the adjacent-year sample).
24  The
adjacent-year sample is likely to be important if the firms exiting or entering the market show different
productivity growth patterns than firms that were in the market for the entire period.  Conducting the analysis
using both samples thus enables us to minimize any effects of survivor bias.
For each sample, we estimate Malmquist indices by firm for each two-year comparison period and
calculate the geometric mean of the resulting estimates to represent market-wide technical efficiency change
(TEC), technical change (TC), and total factor productivity change (TFPC) for each comparison period. We
also present the arithmetic and geometric averages across the nine two-year comparison periods, 1989-1990,
. . . , 1997-1998.
25 For the complete panel sample, we also calculate Malmquist indices that compare the
beginning and ending years of the sample period, 1989 versus 1998.
2630
TFP growth in the adjacent year sample.
27For a more complete theoretical and empirical analysis of organizational form, other organizational
design choices, and efficiency in the Spanish insurance industry, see Cummins and Rubio-Misas (2001).  
  The Malmquist results are summarized in Table 7.  The results are broken out separately for stocks
and mutuals because organizational form is likely to have a particularly significant effect on productivity and
efficiency growth (Grifel-Tatje and Lovell 1996, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi 1999). This is based on the
hypothesis that mutual managers have less incentive than managers of stock insurers to improve the productive
performance of the firm, because of the more limited mechanisms for managerial discipline and control
available in the mutual ownership form (Fama and Jensen 1983).  Thus, we hypothesize that stock insurers
will achieve larger productivity and efficiency growth than mutuals.
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The top section of Table 7 presents the Malmquist analysis based on the complete panel sample.
Immediately below this panel, we present the Malmquist indices for the complete panel 1989 vs. 1998
comparison. The next panel of the table presents the results for the adjacent-year sample. The Malmquist
results are summarized as implied annual rates of productivity growth in the final panel of Table 7.  
The first important conclusion based on Table 7 is that the Spanish insurance market as a whole
experienced productivity growth over the sample period.  Focusing on the total factor productivity (TFP)
change column in the “All Stocks and Mutuals” section in the final panel of the table, we see that total factor
productivity grew at 0.7 percent per year based on the annual geometric mean complete panel results and by
0.6 percent per year based on the 1989 versus 1998 comparison for the complete panel.  These annual growth
rates imply that total productivity growth over the  sample period averaged 6.0 percent based on the annual
complete panel comparisons and 5.1 percent based on the 1989 versus 1998 comparison.  We emphasize that
these are average results and that some insurers achieved higher and lower productivity gains. 
   The second inference to be drawn from Table 7 is that productivity growth estimates based on the
adjacent-year sample are higher on average than for the complete panel sample, e.g., 2.6 percent per year
versus 0.7 percent, based on geometric means.  This is because the complete panel firms are relatively mature31
28The productivity scores for the complete panel firms differ in the two samples because in the complete
panel analysis, the comparison set includes only the complete panel firms, whereas in the adjacent year analysis
the set of comparison firms includes both the complete panel firms and firms not present for the entire period.
29Regression analysis with total factor productivity growth as the dependent variable and firm
characteristics as independent variables confirms that  new entrants and target firms had significantly higher total
factor productivity growth than other exiting, acquiring, and  non-M&A firms. However, the other three entry-
exit categories of firms were not significantly different on average in their productivity growth.
firms with less opportunity to make dramatic productivity gains.  In fact, these firms were more tightly
clustered around the complete panel frontiers in seven of the nine two-year comparison periods than were the
adjacent year sample firms around the adjacent year sample frontiers, suggesting that the complete panel firms
are more homogeneous.
28  Among firms not present for the entire period, entering firms and target firms in
particular experienced relatively large productivity gains.
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The third important conclusion based on Table 7 is that Spanish insurers on average experienced
positive technical efficiency change during the sample period.  For all stocks and mutuals, technical efficiency
change was 4.1 percent per year based on the annual complete panel estimates, 3.6 percent based on the 1989
versus 1998 analysis, and 3.9 percent per year based on the adjacent year sample.  This suggests that firms
were “catching up” to the frontier on average and provides further evidence that consolidation has generally
been beneficial in the Spanish insurance industry. However, Spanish firms on average experienced technical
regress (negative technical change) during the sample period, implying that production frontiers generally did
not achieve favorable shifts over the period.  This finding, which mirrors that of Grifel-Tatje and Lovell (1996)
for Spanish savings banks, may indicate that costs of adjusting to the new regulatory environment led to some
slippage in the production frontier.
The fourth conclusion based on Table 7 is that productivity gains in the Spanish insurance market are
generally in the same range as those for Austria but smaller than productivity gains in Germany.  For the
Spanish industry, total factor productivity grew at 0.7 percent per year for the sample period as a whole based
on the complete panel annual results and 2.6 percent per year based on the adjacent year sample. These results
are generally comparable with Mahlberg and Url’s (1998, 2000) estimates showing an average  productivity32
gain of 3.25 percent per year in Austria for 1992-1996 but less than their estimated productivity gains of 8.25
percent per year in Germany, also for the period 1992-1996. Thus, all three markets have experienced
significant productivity gains in the period encompassing the introduction of the Third Generation Directives.
The fifth important finding based on Table 7 is that stock insurers experienced positive total factor
productivity growth over the sample period, whereas productivity growth was negative on average for mutuals.
The results thus support the hypothesis that incentives to improve performance are stronger under the stock
organizational form than under the mutual organizational form.  E.g., the total factor productivity of stocks
grew at a rate of 1.3 percent per year based on the geometric mean annual results for the complete panel, 1.1
percent per year based on the 1989 versus 1998 complete panel comparison, and 3.3 percent based on the
annual results for the adjacent year sample. The corresponding TFP growth rates for mutuals were -2.6 percent,
-2.2 percent, and -1.7 percent, respectively. Overall, the results suggest that stock firms are primarily defining
the technical frontier and that mutuals on average were falling behind technologically. Thus, stock firms
appear to have responded more effectively to changing market conditions, consistent with the view that stock
managers have stronger incentives to optimize performance than do mutual managers. 
5.  Conclusions
This paper provides new information on the effects of deregulation and consolidation on financial
services markets by analyzing the Spanish insurance industry.  We analyze a sample consisting of nearly all
insurers reporting to the Spanish regulatory authority over the period 1989-1998, which spans the introduction
of the European Union’s Third Generation Insurance Directives in 1994.  The Directives effectively
deregulated the insurance industry except for solvency controls. During the 1980s, the Spanish government
also introduced policy measures designed to encourage consolidation in the insurance industry, the effects of
which are still apparent during our sample period.
We use modern frontier efficiency analysis to measure firm and industry performance over our sample
period. “Best practice” production and cost frontiers are estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA).
The cost frontier provides evidence on cost efficiency, which is decomposed into allocative efficiency, pure33
technical efficiency, and scale efficiency estimates for each firm in the sample in each year. Total factor
productivity growth is analyzed using the Malmquist index methodology.
Our analysis of deregulation and consolidation has four major components: (1) We trace the changes
in the structure of the Spanish insurance market by analyzing concentration trends in the industry and also
analyze the primary sources of inefficiency in the industry. (2) We analyze economies of scale to gauge the
appropriateness of the Spanish government’s policy of encouraging mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the
insurance industry. (3) We analyze the characteristics of firms involved in entry, exit, and M&As in the
industry to determine whether consolidation has removed inefficient and poorly performing firms from the
market. We also estimate probit models to identify variables related to the probability of a firm’s being an
M&A target, a non-M&A exiting firm, and an acquiring firm in the M&A market. (4) Finally, we estimate
total factor productivity growth using Malmquist indices to draw inferences about the relationship between
consolidation and productivity gains or losses in the industry.
Deregulation has led to dramatic changes in the Spanish insurance market.  The number of insurers
in the market declined by 35 percent during our sample period, as firms exited the market due to mergers,
acquisitions, and liquidations, and average firm size increased by 275 percent. Market concentration increased
in the non-life segment of the market and declined in the life insurance market segment, suggesting different
competitive conditions and efficient scales of operation in the two market segments.   
Cost efficiency is relatively low in the Spanish insurance market, averaging only 22.7 percent in 1998.
Thus, Spanish insurers are widely dispersed relative to the Spanish cost frontier, and there are still significant
opportunities for efficiency improvements in Spain.  The primary source of efficiency loss is  allocative
inefficiency, i.e., the failure to choose the optimal mix of inputs.  Average allocative efficiency in 1998 was
only 41.2 percent, whereas pure technical efficiency averaged 60 percent.  Thus, Spanish firms on average are
more successful in employing technology than in choosing optimal inputs.
In eight of ten years of the sample period and for the period as a whole, there is a monotonic
relationship between cost efficiency and firm size quartile in the Spanish insurance industry.  Firms in the34
largest size quartile are more cost efficient primarily because they have higher pure technical efficiencies than
firms in the three smaller size quartiles.  In 1998, average pure technical efficiency in the largest size quartile
(quartile 4) was 78.2 percent, compared to 50.4 percent, 50.2 percent, and 61.1 percent in quartiles 3, 2, and
1.  However, the quartile 4 insurers have about the same allocative efficiency as firms in the other three size
quartiles and lower scale efficiencies than firms in quartiles 2 and 3.  Hence, many large firms would be better
off focusing managerial attention on minimizing costs rather than emphasizing growth.
Consolidation has reduced the proportion of firms operating with increasing returns to scale from 68
percent in 1989 to 47 percent in 1998. The proportion of firms operating with constant returns to scale
increased only slightly over the sample period, while the proportion operating with decreasing returns to scale
increased from 21 to 38 percent. The majority of firms in the top three size deciles operate with decreasing
returns to scale, but 30 percent of non-life and 40 percent of life insurers in the largest size decile have
achieved constant returns to scale. Thus, it is possible for large firms to be scale efficient, but for many large
insurers further efficiency gains  from consolidation are likely to be degraded by scale inefficiency.
The probit analysis provides evidence that the probability of being an M&A target firm is positively
related to scale and allocative efficiency and inversely related to the debt-capital-to-asset ratio, suggesting that
acquisitions have been driven by a quest for size and market share rather than the goal of  rehabilitating under-
performing firms. The probability of exiting the market for non-M&A reasons is inversely related to allocative,
pure technical, and  scale efficiency, firm size, the equity capital-to-assets ratio, and return on equity, providing
strong evidence that non-M&A exits have eliminated relatively small, inefficient, and otherwise poorly
performing firms.  Acquiring firms tend to be larger and better capitalized than non-acquirers and are more
likely to be stock firms, as expected if firms with more financial resources and access to capital markets tend
to succeed in the M&A market. However, there is a significant inverse relationship between scale efficiency
and the probability of being an acquirer, again providing a cautionary note about future gains from
consolidation among large firms.
The Malmquist analysis shows that Spanish insurers experienced average total factor productivity35
growth over the sample period ranging from 0.6 to 2.6 percent per year, depending upon whether the analysis
is limited to firms that were present during the entire sample period or also included firms that entered or
exited the market. The change in total factor productivity was attributable primarily to technical efficiency
growth rather than favorable technical change.  Thus, consolidation has improved efficiency in the Spanish
insurance market, but on average firms have not succeeded in achieving technical improvements. The
productivity gains for the market as a whole are primarily driven by stock insurers, implying that this
organizational form defines the production frontier, and supporting the hypothesis that the stock organizational
form gives managers more incentives to improve firm performance.
Overall, there is substantial evidence that deregulation and consolidation have had beneficial effects
on efficiency in the Spanish insurance industry.  Many inefficient and otherwise poorly performing firms have
exited the market, and acquiring firms in the M&A market have targeted relatively efficient firms with better
than average financial performance. On average, insurers registered significant total factor productivity gains
over the sample period.  The primary caveat in this otherwise favorable picture is that the majority of firms
in the three largest size deciles are operating with decreasing returns to scale, suggesting that policy makers
should exercise caution in encouraging further M&A activity involving the largest firms in the industry. In
addition, many firms continue to operate with low allocative and technical efficiency, suggesting that a shift
in emphasis from growth to cost minimization and technology is the best path to further performance
improvements.References
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Increasing Constant DecreasingTable 1
Concentration Ratios for the Spanish Insurance Industry
Non Life Premiums Life Premiums Total Premiums
Year 4-Firm 8-Firm 20-Firm Herf 4-Firm 8-Firm 20-Firm Herf 4-Firm 8-Firm 20-Firm Herf
89 17.0% 27.2% 47.3% 163.0 57.7% 69.7% 84.2% 1183.0 28.8% 37.3% 54.5% 332.3
(436 firms) (159 firms) (508 firms)
90 16.0% 26% 46.2% 157.5 40.9% 56.1% 75.5% 669.9 17.2% 26.9% 45.8% 164.1
(419 firms) (163 firms) (493 firms)
91 16.0% 26.5% 48.4% 164.3 40.2% 56.0% 78.1% 576.1 18.3% 29.0% 48.6% 176.8
(421 firms) (156 firms) (497 firms)
92 17.2% 26.5% 47.6% 169.0 40.3% 56.2% 75.6% 547.3 17.5% 27.8% 46.7% 162.7
(396 firms) (153 firms) (471 firms)
93 17.9% 27.0% 48.2% 180.1 31.4% 49.4% 70.7% 412.0 15.1% 24.6% 43.8% 144.7
(380 firms) (146 firms) (449 firms)
94 18.8% 28.87% 50.6% 195.2 43.4% 57.8% 78.1% 639.6 22.2% 31.4% 50.5% 206.1
(355 firms) (135 firms) (423 firms)
95 18.7% 29.21% 52.7% 203.7 26.3% 41.2% 68.4% 331.0 14.9% 24.8% 45.6% 150.2
(316 firms) (132 firms) (380 firms)
96 20.0% 30.90% 54.6% 212.9 25.6% 40.3% 66.8% 318.1 15.0% 24.3% 45.7% 149.4
(302 firms) (126 firms) (365 firms)
97 19.4% 30.8% 55.4% 212.4 24.2% 39.4% 64.8% 295.4 13.4% 22.5% 44.5% 142.9
(299 firms) (120 firms) (355 firms)
98 20.5% 33.9% 59.6% 237.9 21.4% 37.1% 68.0% 290.1 12.3% 21.7% 45.3% 149.0
(280 firms) (116 firms) (331 firms)
Note: Six firms with the "depository" organizational forms are omitted from the table.  This organizational form disappeared from the 
market by 1994.Table 2:  Outputs, Inputs, and Input Prices for Spanish Insurance Firms, 1989-1998
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Outputs
Non-life Losses Incurred
Total 536,341 605,792 651,514 672,960 696,462 710,570 743,733 776,458 787,031 839,528
Arithmetic mean 1,181 1,393 1,484 1,653 1,728 1,915 2,125 2,231 2,378 2,865
Standard deviation 3,303 3,882 4,081 4,366 4,675 5,133 5,589 5,786 6,075 7,546
Life Losses Incurred
Total 1,520,200 505,590 670,942 668,157 691,221 1,025,434 979,464 1,132,373 1,278,255 1,306,342
Arithmetic mean 3,348 1,162 1,528 1,642 1,715 2,764 2,798 3,254 3,862 4,459
Standard deviation 30,171 6,591 7,239 7,338 6,802 13,111 9,128 10,416 11,559 12,453
Reinsurance Reserves
Total 219,794 238,170 237,517 241,452 239,789 231,395 217,083 214,796 215,950 230,986
Arithmetic mean 484 548 541 593 595 624 620 617 652 788
Standard deviation 1,461 1,548 1,497 1,547 1,588 1,552 1,599 1,624 1,771 2,178
Non-Reinsurance Reserves
Total 2,461,682 2,199,207 2,423,687 2,622,105 2,854,308 3,475,460 4,016,591 4,592,439 5,144,954 5,530,462
Arithmetic mean 5,422 5,056 5,521 6,443 7,083 9,368 11,476 13,197 15,544 18,875
Standard deviation 26,080 20,916 18,985 19,331 20,824 26,713 30,589 34,742 39,112 45,600
Invested Assets
Total 2,356,321 2,168,652 2,282,134 2,441,355 2,767,209 3,542,359 4,231,598 4,880,899 5,468,130 5,709,576
Arithmetic mean 5,190 4,985 5,198 5,998 6,867 9,548 12,090 14,026 16,520 19,487
Standard deviation 25,776 20,727 18,236 18,028 19,274 25,516 30,267 34,370 39,386 44,945
Inputs
Labor
Total 274,447 294,926 313,467 326,683 324,430 320,522 324,473 338,074 342,794 315,363
Arithmetic mean 605 678 714 803 805 864 927 971 1,036 1,076
Standard deviation 1,374 1,473 1,560 1,700 1,698 1,817 1,991 2,136 2,254 2,399
Business Services
Total 103,234 109,975 118,177 122,999 122,470 123,110 131,396 140,979 145,441 173,758
Arithmetic mean 227 253 269 302 304 332 375 405 439 593
Standard deviation 543 547 569 627 608 680 791 847 893 1,241
Debt Capital
Total 466,910 335,859 352,417 363,748 338,577 346,725 339,358 349,962 380,347 609,951
Arithmetic mean 1,028 772 803 894 840 935 970 1,006 1,149 2,082
Standard deviation 5,455 2,068 1,941 2,159 1,869 1,989 2,102 2,131 2,650 8,631
Equity Capital
Total 500,476 519,818 578,758 565,192 602,525 577,429 649,964 759,880 787,596 771,317
Arithmetic mean 1,102 1,195 1,318 1,389 1,495 1,556 1,857 2,184 2,379 2,632
Standard deviation 3,120 3,123 3,355 3,477 3,625 3,767 4,176 5,035 5,432 5,406
Input Prices
Labor 1.670 1.751 1.846 1.892 1.941 1.964 1.984 2.034 2.078 2.191
Business Services 1.216 1.329 1.446 1.572 1.678 1.740 1.824 1.884 1.928 1.999
Debt Capital 0.131 0.138 0.123 0.121 0.105 0.079 0.097 0.072 0.050 0.038
Equity Capital 0.290 0.307 0.312 0.294 0.274 0.274 0.238 0.226 0.218 0.228
Number 454 435 439 407 403 371 350 348 331 293
Note: Monetary variables are expressed in constant million 1986 ptas, based on the Spanish consumer price index.Table 3:  Efficiency of Spanish Insurance Firms, 1989-1998




Cost Efficiency 0.112 0.108 0.091 0.109 0.120 0.105 0.107 0.105 0.123 0.197 0.118
Pure Technical Efficiency 0.392 0.312 0.349 0.409 0.410 0.418 0.436 0.465 0.462 0.611 0.426
Allocative Efficiency 0.435 0.652 0.364 0.426 0.427 0.407 0.350 0.325 0.345 0.398 0.413
Scale Efficiency 0.689 0.592 0.785 0.701 0.688 0.622 0.725 0.692 0.798 0.799 0.709
Quartile 2
Cost Efficiency 0.152 0.180 0.145 0.155 0.146 0.137 0.140 0.144 0.181 0.202 0.158
Pure Technical Efficiency 0.286 0.298 0.336 0.311 0.323 0.338 0.351 0.362 0.470 0.502 0.358
Allocative Efficiency 0.557 0.653 0.459 0.517 0.474 0.443 0.423 0.421 0.409 0.412 0.477
Scale Efficiency 0.906 0.902 0.937 0.922 0.935 0.936 0.941 0.933 0.923 0.936 0.927
Quartile 3
Cost Efficiency 0.153 0.171 0.136 0.157 0.160 0.184 0.163 0.199 0.211 0.208 0.174
Pure Technical Efficiency 0.357 0.340 0.345 0.393 0.405 0.443 0.403 0.444 0.457 0.504 0.409
Allocative Efficiency 0.488 0.570 0.466 0.472 0.436 0.439 0.423 0.447 0.453 0.407 0.460
Scale Efficiency 0.942 0.952 0.969 0.973 0.973 0.953 0.971 0.920 0.940 0.956 0.955
Quartile 4
Cost Efficiency 0.203 0.252 0.201 0.263 0.245 0.238 0.234 0.241 0.299 0.300 0.248
Pure Technical Efficiency 0.640 0.608 0.594 0.646 0.646 0.676 0.694 0.731 0.719 0.782 0.674
Allocative Efficiency 0.441 0.505 0.433 0.473 0.429 0.421 0.372 0.365 0.458 0.431 0.433
Scale Efficiency 0.786 0.865 0.842 0.855 0.863 0.837 0.880 0.869 0.855 0.880 0.853
All Firms
Cost Efficiency 0.155 0.178 0.143 0.171 0.168 0.166 0.161 0.172 0.204 0.227 0.174
Pure Technical Efficiency 0.419 0.390 0.406 0.440 0.446 0.469 0.472 0.501 0.527 0.600 0.467
Allocative Efficiency 0.480 0.595 0.431 0.472 0.441 0.427 0.392 0.389 0.417 0.412 0.446
Scale Efficiency 0.830 0.827 0.883 0.862 0.865 0.836 0.879 0.854 0.879 0.893 0.861M&A Target Acquiring Non-M&A
Efficiency Type Mean Std. Dev NM e a n S t d .  D e v N Mean Std. Dev NM e a n S t d .  D e v NM e a n S t d .  D e v N
1989-1997
Cost  0.170 0.137 100 0.120 0.112 32 0.097 0.093 30 0.150 0.111 85 0.157 0.148 484
Pure Technical  0.452 0.270 100 0.449 0.299 32 0.260 0.271 30 0.504 0.298 85 0.428 0.263 484
Allocative  0.463 0.213 100 0.454 0.207 32 0.523 0.200 30 0.397 0.155 85 0.459 0.164 484
Scale  0.879 0.176 100 0.751 0.303 32 0.871 0.177 30 0.861 0.148 85 0.842 0.202 484
1989
Cost  0.246 0.168 24 0.111 0.035 5 0.023 0.017 3 0.129 0.079 26 0.148 0.148 389
Pure Technical  0.449 0.229 24 0.383 0.303 5 0.357 0.557 3 0.484 0.345 26 0.407 0.296 389
Allocative  0.608 0.196 24 0.514 0.166 5 0.389 0.162 3 0.481 0.191 26 0.472 0.198 389
Scale  0.905 0.155 24 0.780 0.245 5 0.570 0.332 3 0.726 0.244 26 0.836 0.215 389
1990
Cost  0.184 0.052 6 0.180 0.191 7 0.064 0.065 11 0.195 0.182 29 0.177 0.180 379
Pure Technical  0.450 0.290 6 0.406 0.304 7 0.099 0.080 11 0.472 0.325 29 0.386 0.285 379
Allocative  0.538 0.172 6 0.583 0.200 7 0.688 0.128 11 0.614 0.245 29 0.593 0.219 379
Scale  0.895 0.088 6 0.830 0.277 7 0.842 0.151 11 0.804 0.193 29 0.826 0.226 379
1991
Cost  0.086 0.029 11 0.079 0.047 7 0.107 0.100 5 0.131 0.088 39 0.148 0.161 375
Pure Technical  0.185 0.122 11 0.509 0.257 7 0.206 0.161 5 0.496 0.339 39 0.402 0.295 375
Allocative  0.591 0.156 11 0.267 0.159 7 0.509 0.090 5 0.403 0.165 39 0.431 0.192 375
Scale  0.915 0.141 11 0.738 0.347 7 0.966 0.045 5 0.843 0.190 39 0.889 0.183 375
1992
Cost  0.228 0.160 4 0.053 0.036 3 0 0.136 0.082 40 0.175 0.185 359
Pure Technical  0.659 0.253 4 0.244 0.204 3 0 0.489 0.331 40 0.432 0.293 359
Allocative  0.376 0.255 4 0.492 0.142 3 0 0.416 0.166 40 0.479 0.205 359
Scale  0.968 0.032 4 0.656 0.394 3 0 0.840 0.179 40 0.865 0.195 359
1993
Cost  0.119 0.071 12 0.082 0.039 7 0.300 0 1 0.128 0.081 45 0.177 0.179 335
Pure Technical  0.403 0.220 12 0.468 0.371 7 0.461 0 1 0.483 0.327 45 0.443 0.287 335
Allocative  0.368 0.165 12 0.418 0.240 7 0.651 0 1 0.383 0.153 45 0.452 0.178 335
Scale  0.862 0.170 12 0.688 0.353 7 1.000 0 1 0.858 0.158 45 0.869 0.191 335
1994
Cost  0.142 0.143 12 0.184 0.045 2 0.128 0 1 0.144 0.118 51 0.171 0.172 299
Pure Technical  0.477 0.305 12 0.512 0.221 2 0.246 0 1 0.493 0.301 51 0.466 0.292 299
Allocative  0.337 0.120 12 0.610 0.006 2 0.586 0 1 0.371 0.132 51 0.439 0.188 299
Scale  0.822 0.185 12 0.684 0.436 2 0.890 0 1 0.841 0.179 51 0.839 0.218 299
1995
Cost  0.105 0.055 10 0 0.102 0.059 4 0.146 0.130 53 0.168 0.175 279
Pure Technical  0.481 0.308 10 0 0.520 0.336 4 0.498 0.310 53 0.468 0.294 279
Allocative  0.324 0.200 10 0 0.259 0.107 4 0.352 0.186 53 0.405 0.193 279
Scale  0.928 0.088 10 0 0.883 0.130 4 0.889 0.124 53 0.876 0.197 279
1996
Cost  0.178 0.185 11 0 0.083 0.018 2 0.152 0.127 60 0.177 0.192 273
Pure Technical  0.596 0.294 11 0 0.174 0.078 2 0.524 0.288 60 0.493 0.295 273
Allocative  0.360 0.241 11 0 0.513 0.124 2 0.351 0.184 60 0.399 0.198 273
Scale  0.791 0.292 11 0 0.981 0.003 2 0.864 0.147 60 0.853 0.198 273
1997
Cost  0.195 0.124 10 0.380 0.000 1 0.198 0.163 3 0.174 0.157 59 0.211 0.211 255
Pure Technical  0.516 0.281 10 1.000 0.000 1 0.491 0.299 3 0.531 0.295 59 0.522 0.290 255
Allocative  0.478 0.167 10 0.380 0.000 1 0.373 0.270 3 0.367 0.155 59 0.428 0.198 255
Scale  0.872 0.225 10 1.000 0.000 1 0.982 0.008 3 0.876 0.161 59 0.881 0.163 255
Table 4A: Efficiency and Consolidation: 1989-1997













Type of Efficiency t-Value t-Value t-Value t-Value t-Value
Cost 2.06 ** 3.35 *** 1.10 0.82 0.07
Pure Technical  0.06 3.41 *** -1.23 0.82 0.38
Allocative  0.21 -1.44 2.42 ** 0.17 -0.06













Type of Efficiency t-Value t-Value t-Value t-ValueValue t-Value
Cost -1.27 -1.78 * -2.54 ** -3.32 *** -0.55
Pure Technical  -0.89 0.38 -4.13 *** -3.31 *** 2.20 **
Allocative  1.41 -0.14 3.14 *** 1.73 * -3.36 ***
Scale -1.97 ** -1.69 * 0.28 0.85 1.00
Note: Pairwise comparisons are based on average efficiencies for each category of firm for the entire sample period,
1989-1997.  In each comparison, the average efficiency for the second type of firm is subtracted from the average
efficiency for the first type of firm to conduct the test.  E.g., the test statistics in the Target vs. Other Exiting tests 
are equal to the average efficiencies of the Target firms minus the average efficiencies of the Other Exiting Firms.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.Targets
Other 
Exiting Entering Acquirer Non-M&A
Number of firms 100 32 30 85 484
Total Assets
Mean 6,879 1,852 8,166 26,965 8,252
Std. Dev 20,046 2,531 18,268 50,694 21,987
Median 624 856 1,439 9,233 1,123
Total Premiums
Mean 2,825 1,038 2,267 10,222 3,154
Std. Dev 7,040 2,078 6,896 14,695 8,042
Median 511 162 290 5,067 615
Equity capital to assets ratio
Mean 0.392 0.433 0.588 0.290 0.430
Std. Dev 0.265 0.305 0.336 0.236 0.272
Median 0.384 0.340 0.609 0.184 0.401
Debt capital to assets ratio
Mean 0.135 0.182 0.100 0.115 0.128
Std. Dev 0.105 0.178 0.119 0.100 0.104
Median 0.118 0.133 0.044 0.089 0.101
Invested assets to assets ratio
Mean 0.449 0.387 0.489 0.580 0.479
Std. Dev 0.252 0.214 0.342 0.208 0.213
Median 0.455 0.384 0.441 0.575 0.477
Return on equity before tax*
Mean 0.107 -0.040 0.028 0.065 0.076
Std. Dev 0.212 0.216 0.137 0.183 0.143
Median 0.083 -0.022 0.015 0.069 0.081
Reins reserves/Total reserves
Mean 0.083 0.127 0.093 0.123 0.135
Std. Dev 0.150 0.210 0.199 0.183 0.216
Median 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.059 0.014
Life insurance premiums
Mean 4388 392 1340 5699 4502
Std. Dev 11096 682 3099 12495 10072
N 25 7 15 50 161
Median 743 123 214 1053 996
Non-life insurance premiums
Mean 2033 1054 2661 8342 1927
Std. Dev 4512 2162 8487 10665 5169
N 85 29 18 70 416
Median 494 180 397 4345 460
Life specialists 12.0% 9.4% 40.0% 17.7% 14.3%
Non-life specialists 74.0% 75.0% 50.0% 40.0% 64.7%
Joint firms  14.0% 15.6% 10.0% 42.4% 21.1%
Stocks 87.0% 81.3% 90.0% 94.1% 78.3%
Mutuals 4.0% 12.5% 10.0% 3.5% 14.3%
Other organizational forms 9.0% 6.2% 0.0% 2.4% 7.4%
Note: Monetary variables are expressed in constant million 1986 ptas.
*Firms with return on equity>0.5 and <-0.5 are excluded in calculating means and medians.




























Total Assets 2.45 -0.33 -3.43 -0.61 -1.88 -4.55 -5.84 -2.92 -0.02 3.35
** *** * *** *** *** ***
Total Premiums 2.25 0.39 -4.25 -0.42 -0.94 -5.61 -4.08 -3.92 -0.68 4.32
** *** *** *** *** ***
Equity capital- -0.69 -2.94 2.78 -1.30 -1.90 2.40 0.06 4.50 2.53 -4.94
   to-assets *** *** * ** *** ** ***
Debt capital- - 1 . 4 01 . 4 61 . 3 00 . 6 32 . 1 41 . 9 91 . 6 9 - 0 . 6 4 - 1 . 2 5 - 1 . 0 5
   to-assets ** ** *
Invested assets- 1.36 -0.60 -3.87 -1.10 -1.40 -4.38 -2.35 -1.37 0.17 4.12
   to-assets *** *** ** ***
Return on Equity 3.35 2.40 1.43 1.39 -1.49 -2.43 -2.98 -1.16 -1.85 -0.52
   before tax *** ** ** *** *
Reins reserves- -1.08 -0.25 -1.61 -2.90 0.65 0.08 -0.22 -0.73 -1.12 -0.54
   to-total reserves ***
Life premiums 3.58 2.45 -0.75 -0.10 -1.64 -3.90 -8.68 -2.97 -4.34 0.84
*** ** *** *** *** ***
Non-life premiums 1.66 -0.39 -5.08 0.21 -1.01 -5.98 -1.95 -2.94 0.47 5.43
* *** *** * *** ***
Note: Pairwise comparisons are based on average efficiencies for each category of firm for the entire sample period, 1989-1997.  In 
each comparison, the average efficiency for the second type of firm is subtracted from the average efficiency for the first type of firm
to conduct the test.  E.g., the test statistics in the Target vs. Other Exiting comparisons are equal to the average efficiencies of the 
Target Firms minus the average efficiencies of the Other Exiting Firms.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.Table 6
Probit Analysis: Acquisiton Targets, Other Exiting, and Acquiring Firms
Spanish Insurers: 1989-1997
Dependent Variable
M&A Target Other Exiting Acquiring
Independent Variables Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat Coefficient z-Stat
C -3.052 -8.10 *** 1.928 6.24 *** -2.920 -8.22 ***
Allocative Efficiency 0.462 2.90 *** -0.715 -3.99 *** -0.155 -0.81
Pure Technical Efficiency -0.198 -1.51 -0.224 -1.75 * -0.197 -1.41
Scale Efficiency 0.733 3.44 *** -1.130 -6.80 *** -0.574 -3.13 ***
Stock Firm 0.730 5.80 *** -0.019 -0.22 0.465 3.66 ***
Life Insurance Only Specialist Dummy 0.221 1.85 * -0.366 -2.99 *** -0.737 -5.65 ***
Non-Life Insurance Specialist Dummy 0.403 3.80 *** -0.152 -1.69 * -0.617 -6.83 ***
Log of Total Premiums 0.036 1.34 -0.106 -4.44 *** 0.240 8.50 ***
Equity Capital/Assets 0.281 1.38 -1.380 -6.68 *** 0.838 3.58 ***
Debt Capital/Assets -0.944 -3.08 *** -0.051 -0.17 0.157 0.35
Return on Equity -0.208 -0.86 -0.823 -3.28 *** 0.032 0.12
D90 0.189 1.69 * -0.008 -0.07 -0.193 -1.15
D91 -0.022 -0.19 -0.156 -1.38 0.052 0.33
D92 -0.158 -1.29 -0.251 -2.17 ** 0.088 0.57
D93 -0.186 -1.49 -0.337 -2.84 *** 0.101 0.65
D94 -0.312 -2.32 ** -0.587 -4.53 *** 0.244 1.63
D95 -0.494 -3.34 *** -0.853 -5.65 *** 0.323 2.11 **
D96 -0.742 -4.50 *** -1.109 -6.41 *** 0.278 1.79 *
D97 -1.110 -5.57 *** -1.143 -6.11 *** 0.346 2.26 **
N 3346 3346 3346
Log Likelihood -957.52 -1011.55 -781.45
Restricted Log likelihood -1073.15 -1155.13 -952.94
Psuedo R
2 0.108 0.124 0.180
Note: The dependent variable in the M&A Target regression equals 1 for M&A target firms and 0 otherwise. The dependent
variable in the Other Exiting regression equals 1 for firms that exited the market due to insolvency or voluntary liquidation
and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable in the Acquiring regression equals 1 for acquiring firms and 0 otherwise.  The 
life and non-life specialist dummies equal 1 for the respective specializations and 0 otherwise.Table 7: Malmquist Productivity Indices: Summary Table
Stock Mutual
TE Change T Change TFP Change TE Change T Change TFP Change TE Change T Change TFP Change
Complete Panel of Firms Present in All Years
N
1989-1990 201 0.916 1.042 0.955 0.961 0.938 0.901 0.923 1.024 0.945
1990-1991 201 1.242 0.819 1.018 0.956 0.964 0.922 1.190 0.841 1.001
1991-1992 201 1.038 0.982 1.018 1.065 1.030 1.097 1.042 0.989 1.031
1992-1993 201 1.054 0.963 1.015 1.067 0.922 0.984 1.056 0.956 1.010
1993-1994 201 1.063 1.033 1.099 1.054 0.920 0.970 1.062 1.013 1.076
1994-1995 201 0.942 1.095 1.031 0.873 1.149 1.003 0.930 1.103 1.026
1995-1996 201 1.145 0.861 0.986 1.133 0.827 0.937 1.143 0.856 0.978
1996-1997 201 1.047 0.962 1.007 1.053 0.933 0.983 1.048 0.957 1.003
1997-1998 201 0.995 1.001 0.996 1.047 0.935 0.979 1.004 0.990 0.993
Geometric Mean 1.045 0.970 1.013 1.021 0.954 0.974 1.041 0.967 1.007
Arithmetic Mean 1.049 0.973 1.014 1.023 0.958 0.975 1.044 0.970 1.007
Complete Panel: 1989 vs 1998* 1.399 0.792 1.107 1.267 0.644 0.816 1.375 0.764 1.051
All Firms Present in Each Adjacent Two-Year Period
1989-1990 390 0.947 1.021 0.967 1.001 0.934 0.935 0.955 1.007 0.962
1990-1991 402 1.252 0.852 1.066 1.061 0.912 0.968 1.224 0.860 1.052
1991-1992 392 1.059 0.990 1.048 1.010 1.028 1.038 1.052 0.995 1.047
1992-1993 383 1.019 1.007 1.027 0.952 1.024 0.975 1.010 1.010 1.020
1993-1994 363 0.989 1.099 1.087 1.014 0.958 0.972 0.993 1.079 1.072
1994-1995 337 1.069 0.964 1.031 0.966 1.071 1.035 1.055 0.978 1.031
1995-1996 328 1.088 0.914 0.994 1.039 0.877 0.911 1.081 0.909 0.983
1996-1997 320 1.008 1.039 1.047 1.016 1.003 1.019 1.009 1.034 1.043
1997-1998 286 0.994 1.038 1.031 1.020 0.982 1.002 0.998 1.030 1.027
Geometric Mean 1.044 0.989 1.033 1.008 0.975 0.983 1.039 0.987 1.026
Arithmetic Mean 1.047 0.992 1.033 1.009 0.977 0.984 1.042 0.989 1.026
Implied Annual Rates of Productivity Growth
Complete Panel of Firms Present in All Years
   Geometric Mean 4.5% -3.0% 1.3% 2.1% -4.6% -2.6% 4.1% -3.3% 0.7%
   Arithmeric Mean 4.9% -2.7% 1.4% 2.3% -4.2% -2.5% 4.4% -3.0% 0.7%
Complete Panel: 1989-98** 3.8% -2.6% 1.1% 2.7% -4.8% -2.2% 3.6% -2.9% 0.6%
All Firms Present in Each Adjacent Two-Year Period
   Geometric Mean 4.4% -1.1% 3.3% 0.8% -2.5% -1.7% 3.9% -1.3% 2.6%
   Arithmeric Mean 4.7% -0.8% 3.3% 0.9% -2.3% -1.6% 4.2% -1.1% 2.6%
Key: TE = technical efficiency, T = technical, TFP = total factor productivity. *Malmquist analysis for 1989 vs. 1998.  **Implied annual growth rate.
Note: In calculating the averages, firms were omitted if their total factor productivity index exceeded the 99th percentile or was less than the 1st percentile of TFP 
indices for the entire sample period, based on the complete panel sample.  This approach had a very slight effect on the reported averages and does not change 
the conclusions to be drawn from the table.
All Stocks and Mutuals